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The public debt crisis is not limited to Greece or to the 
Euro  area.  In  fact,  several  developed  economies  face 
rapidly  growing  debt-to-GDP  ratios,  which  raise  doubts 
about their long-term solvency. Thus, suggesting that the 
Eurozone is undergoing a currency crisis or is in danger of 
disintegration  is  not  the  right  diagnosis  (or  at  least 
premature).  However,  if  prudent  fiscal  policies,  fiscal 
discipline  and  far-reaching  structural  reforms  are  not 
undertaken soon, both the EU and EMU may face serious 
internal  tensions  and  obstacles  to  future  economic 
growth.  
This is not a Euro crisis This is not a Euro crisis This is not a Euro crisis    
A currency crisis can be defined as a sudden decline in 
confidence in a given currency, leading to a speculative 
attack  against  it  and  resulting  in  its  substantial 
depreciation.  Nothing  like  this  has  happened  with  the 
Euro so far. True, the Euro lost a bit against the US dollar 
and other currencies, but this remained within a “normal” 
fluctuation range among major currencies over the last 
few years. There is equally no desire by any country to 
leave the Eurozone.  
In  this  context  the  analogies  to  the  demise  of  the 
Argentinean currency board in 2001-2002¹ are wrong. The 
direct  cause  of  abandoning  Argentina’s  currency  board 
was related to insufficient foreign exchange reserves and 
the  Central  Bank’s  inability  to  defend  Argentina’s  fixed 
exchange  rate  (peso  to  US  dollar)  against  speculative 
attack.  In  fact,  Argentina  did  not  have  a  true  currency 
board, which required 100% reserve backing.  
The  hypothetical  exit  of  Greece  (or  any  other  country) 
from the Euro would require the reintroduction of its own 
national currency, while all outstanding private and public 
liabilities would remain denominated in Euros. Therefore, 
attempts  to  exit  the  Euro  (which  cannot  happen 
technically overnight as an ordinary currency devaluation) 
would mean, in practice, an immediate default on both 
public and most private debt, caused by soaring debt-to-
GDP  ratios  and  total  financial  chaos.  This  would  do 
nothing to repair Greece’s debt woes or help any other 
European  economy.  In  today’s  sophisticated  and 
interdependent  economies,  devaluation  is  neither 
effective  nor  believed  to  be  the  universal  medicine  of 
choice.  
…but a standard public debt crisis …but a standard public debt crisis …but a standard public debt crisis    
Instead of speaking about the Euro crisis one should speak 
about  the  public  debt  crisis.  Greece’s  current  fiscal 
problems  are  a  surprise  to  nobody  as  they  have 
systematically accrued over the last 30 years (see Figure 
1). Worse, the fiscal crisis is not limited to Greece. Several 
other countries, not only those within the Eurozone and 
the EU (see Table 1), have recorded a dramatic increase in 
their public debt-to-GDP ratios over the last two years. 
Due to years of fiscal indiscipline, scale of global recession 
(automatic  fiscal  stabilizers)  and  poor  design  of  fiscal 
stimulus packages, the list of victims includes but is not 
limited to Japan, US, UK, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
Hungary.  
The current public debt crisis is not a new phenomenon, 
and as we mentioned above, is not limited to Eurozone 
countries.  The  choice  of  monetary  regime  has  a  very 
limited impact on fiscal accounts. Economic history gives 
us several examples of public debt defaults both under 
the gold standard, and fiat currencies, as well as under 
fixed and floating exchange rate regimes.  
Therefore, the debt crisis must be addressed by means of 
fiscal and structural reforms. Public expenditures must be 
reduced (including the most costly and wasteful spheres 
of  social  transfers),  taxes  must  be  more  effectively 
collected  and,  in  some  cases,  increased.  All  of  these 
measures are not easy and involve high political costs.  
What  is  promising  is  that  the  Greek  crisis  changed  the 
intellectual  perspective  towards  Europe’s  fiscal  policy 
challenges.  The  previous  calls  for  fiscal  stimulus  have 
largely  disappeared  giving  way  to  discussions  on  fiscal 
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increasing  the  retirement  age)  and  strengthening  fiscal 
discipline  at  both  the  EU  and  national  levels.  This  can 
help  overhaul  Europe’s  public  finances,  which  is 
necessary  to  avoid  future  macroeconomic  turbulences 
and ensure economic growth.  
Changes in fiscal surveillance rules Changes in fiscal surveillance rules Changes in fiscal surveillance rules    
The EU’s fiscal surveillance rules are based on provisions 
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU, Article 126 and Protocol No. 12) and the Stability 
and  Growth  Pact  (SGP),  i.e.  secondary  legislation. 
Unfortunately,  both  lack  the  effective  sanction 
mechanisms  with  respect  to  those  member  states 
(especially large ones) that breach the rules. Worse, in 
2005  the  SGP  was  watered  down  under  collective 
pressure by its major offenders.  
After agreeing to a Greek rescue package, the European 
Commission  presented  a  set  of  measures  aimed  at 
reinforcing  the  SGP.  This  included  strengthening 
Eurostat’s mandate to audit national statistics (in light of 
negative  experiences  with  Greece’s  misreported  fiscal 
data), speeding up the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), 
particularly  in  respect  to  repeated  SGP  offenders,  and 
tightening  financial  sanctions  such  as  suspending 
Cohesion  Fund  transfers  or  more  rigorous  use  of  EU 
expenditure to ensure better compliance with SGP rules. 
The current focus of EDP on fiscal deficit criterion is to be 
amended,  with  a  greater  emphasis  on  the  level  and 
dynamic of public debt and long-term fiscal sustainability. 
The Commission also offers the idea of the “European 
Semester”, which should provide a mechanism of early 
peer review (at the beginning of each calendar year) of 
the  Stability  and  Convergence  Programs  as  well  as 
national draft budgets.  
All of these proposals seem to go in the right direction, 
but  they  will  hardly  make  a  substantial  difference  in 
Treaty and SGP enforcement mechanisms. Instead, they 
will pose a greater threat for smaller and lower-income 
countries. The former have limited voting power in the 
Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  Council  (ECOFIN),  the 
latter are net recipients of EU budget transfers. Making 
sanctions  truly  serious  and  potentially  painful  for  all 
countries abusing fiscal surveillance rules would require 
(i)  ensuring  their  automatic  (instead  of  discretionary) 
character; (ii) going beyond financial fines (which may be 
difficult to enforce in difficult economic times and when 
countries require extra financial support). Such additional 
sanctions  could  involve  suspending  voting  rights  in 
ECOFIN  and  perhaps  in  the  Governing  Council  of  the 
European Central Bank (in cases where Maastricht fiscal 
criteria  are  breached).  However,  this  would  require 
changes  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  which  do  not  seem 
realistic over the next few years.  
National fiscal rules National fiscal rules National fiscal rules    
As  fiscal  policy  remains  mostly  the  prerogative  of 
individual EU member states, their national legislations 
can play a crucial role in tightening fiscal discipline and 
preventing  a  future  public  debt  crisis.  Several member 
states have certain fiscal rules written down into  their 
constitutions and ordinary legislation. However, in some 
cases they have never been tested in practice (like a 60% 
public debt-to-GDP limit in Poland’s Constitution). Some 
countries  have  set  up  special  institutions  in  charge  of 
monitoring long-term fiscal sustainability (like the Fiscal 
Policy  Councils  in  Sweden  and  Hungary  or  the  newly 
created Office for Budget Responsibility in the UK). One 
may expect that fears of future debt crises will push more 
countries towards strengthening their national fiscal rules 
and  institutions,  including  internalizing  the  EU’s  fiscal 
rules. Germany’s 2009 constitutional amendment, which 
limits  opportunities  to  increase  public  debt  both  on  a 
federal and state (land) level, is a good example to follow.  
Financial  markets  can  also  play  a  positive  role  in 
increasing fiscal discipline on a national level. Almost non
-existent spreads between yields on government bonds 
within the EMU and very low spreads in respect to other 
EU members seem to be gone for good. More generally, 
risk  premia  on  government  bonds  will  have  to  be 
reassessed  almost  everywhere,  against  the  increasing 
danger  of  public  debt  crisis  in  many  countries.  At  the 
moment,  financial  markets  seem  to  increasingly  over-
react  to  default  risk  premia  in  peripheral  EMU 
economies. However, in the long-term, a more balanced 
assessment  has  a  chance  to  provide  the  right  warning 
signals to policymakers.  
A European rescue mechanism A European rescue mechanism A European rescue mechanism    
It is no secret that the EU lacks the fiscal capacity to offer 
a crisis resolution mechanism on its own. This applies to 
both  systemic  banking  and  financial  sector  crises  (as 
happened  in  the  fall  of  2008)  and  sovereign  debt  or 
balance of payment crises. Designing such a mechanism 
is not easy both for legal and conceptual reasons. The 
size of the EU budget does not exceed 1% of total Gross 
National  Income  (GNI)  of  EU  member  states.  Its 
expenditures are strictly allocated to support major EU 
common polices such as the Cohesion Policy, Common 
Agriculture  Policy,  competitiveness,  research,  and 
development aid. The medium-term budget perspective 
requires a unanimous decision by all member states. In 
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addition, Article 125 of TFEU prohibits any direct bailout 
of member states.  
However,  in  light  of  a  potential  Greek  default,  these 
limitations and fears of creating moral hazard incentives 
have to be put against the dangers of an uncontrolled 
and highly devastating contagion effect. The latter could 
involve not only the simple domino effect, i.e. flight from 
government bonds in other EU/EMU member states such 
as Portugal, Spain and Italy but also the next round of the 
European banking crisis (due to banks’ high exposure to 
public debt and the fragility of their balance sheets).  
As a result, on May 9, 2010 ECOFIN agreed to establish 
the  European  Financial  Stabilization  Mechanism  which 
consists  of  €60  billion  of  the  EU’s  own  resources  and 
€440  billion  of  the  Special  Purpose  Vehicle  that  is 
guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating member 
states. More importantly, this mechanism is backed  by 
IMF resources. Greece became the first beneficiary of this 
mechanism (closely coordinated with the standard IMF 
stand-by loan and its conditionality).  
This  is,  however,  only  a  temporary  and  emergency 
solution. In the long-term a permanent crisis resolution 
mechanism  needs  to  be  set  up  on  the  EU  level,  in 
addition  to  stronger  fiscal  surveillance  rules.  Greece’s 
problems are only the tip, of a rapidly growing EU fiscal 
liability iceberg. Leaving the rescue operations solely to 
the IMF is not realistic because of its limited resources 
and  limits  to  policy  conditionality.  It  will  not  calm  the 
financial markets in times of distress, as the recent Greek 
episode (and danger of spillover) clearly demonstrated.  
One  proposal,  which  tries  to  offer  not  only  a  rescue 
mechanism  but  also  an  orderly  sovereign  default 
mechanism, calls for the establishment of the European 
Monetary  Fund.  Another  proposal  suggests  sharing 
responsibility for part of the public debt within the EMU, 
but this (like the blue bonds/red bonds mechanism) may 
raise  the  risk  of  moral  hazard  and  requires  further 
discussion.  
ECB credibility at stake ECB credibility at stake ECB credibility at stake    
Part of Greece’s rescue package was provided by the ECB, 
via government bond market intervention under the so-
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called  Security  Market  Program.  Its  official 
justification  was  to  provide  temporary  liquidity 
relief  to  financial  market  segments  suffering 
distress. In terms of money supply, the effects of 
this intervention have been sterilized by ECB term 
deposits, however, it compromised the reputation 
of  this  institution  and  raised  financial  market 
doubts  about  its  actual  policy  priorities  in  the 
future. In fact, it may result in serious problems 
for  macroeconomic  and  financial  stability  in 
Europe. In addition, long-term costs (in terms of 
lost  credibility)  may  well  exceed  the  short-term 
benefits  coming  from  temporary  bond  market 
relief. This is the shortest path from public debt 
crisis (which has already happened) to an eventual 
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Region/ Country  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
EU-27  62.2  62.7  61.4  58.8  61.6  73.6 
Euro area  69.5  70.1  68.3  66.0  69.4  78.7 
Austria  64.8  63.9  62.2  59.5  62.6  66.5 
Belgium  94.2  92.1  88.1  84.2  89.8  96.7 
Bulgaria  37.9  29.2  22.7  18.2  14.1  14.8 
Czech Republic  30.1  29.7  29.4  29.0  30.0  35.4 
Cyprus  70.2  69.1  64.6  58.3  48.4  56.2 
Denmark  44.5  37.1  32.1  27.4  34.2  41.6 
Estonia  5.0  4.6  4.5  3.8  4.6  7.2 
Germany  65.7  68.0  67.6  65.0  66.0  73.2 
Greece  98.6  100.0  97.8  95.7  99.2  115.1 
Hungary  59.1  61.8  65.6  65.9  72.9  78.3 
Ireland  29.7  27.6  24.9  25.0  43.9  64.0 
Finland  44.4  41.8  39.7  35.2  34.2  44.0 
France  64.9  66.4  63.7  63.8  67.5  77.6 
Italy  103.8  105.8  106.5  103.5  106.1  115.8 
Latvia  14.9  12.4  10.7  9.0  19.5  36.1 
Lithuania  19.4  18.4  18.0  16.9  15.6  29.3 
Luxembourg  6.3  6.1  6.5  6.7  13.7  14.5 
Malta  72.1  70.2  63.7  61.9  63.7  69.1 
Netherlands  52.4  51.8  47.4  45.5  58.2  60.9 
Poland  45.7  47.1  47.7  45.0  47.2  51.0 
Portugal  58.3  63.6  64.7  63.6  66.3  76.8 
Romania  18.7  15.8  12.4  12.6  13.3  23.7 
Slovakia  41.5  34.2  30.5  29.3  27.7  35.7 
Slovenia  27.2  27.0  26.7  23.4  22.6  35.9 
Spain  46.2  43.0  39.6  36.2  39.7  53.2 
Sweden  51.3  51.0  45.7  40.8  38.3  42.3 
UK  40.6  42.2  43.5  44.7  52.0  68.1 
Table 1: Gross debt to GDP in EU, in %, 2004-2009  
Note: Blue fields indicate countries where the public debt to GDP ratio increased by 15 
percentage points or more in the period of 2007-2009 
Source: Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?
dataset=gov_dd_edpt1&lang=en 